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The court determined that in order to
prove a violation of the CPA, the investors had to prove that the Denver's act
(1) was unfair or deceptive, (2) occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce, (3) affected the public interest,
and (4) caused injury to the plaintiff in
his or her business or property. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v.
Safeco Title Ins. Co., 796 P.2d 531
(Wash. 1986). To establish that misconduct occurred in commerce or trade,
the investors had to demonstrate that
the legal services in question related to
"entrepreneurial aspects" of the practice of law.
The investors argued that if Denver
had not concealed his potential conflict
of interest, they would not have employed him. The investors contended
that this deceptive practice constituted
part of the "entrepreneurial aspect" of
Denver's practice because he was able
to secure them as paying clients.
The court did not agree with the
investors' argument because a material
issue of fact existed as to whether
Denver acted for the purpose of increasing profits or gaining clients. The
court therefore reasoned that the investors did not prove Denver's intent to
conceal the risk of conflict in order to
further his personal entrepreneurial interests.
Finally, the court rejected the investors' claim that the trial court erred in
refusing to award treble reimbursement damages or attorney's fees. The
court reasoned that the question of
Denver's liability under the CPA remained unresolved, and thus damage
awards were premature. However, the
court speculated that even if a CPA
violation was found, the trial court had
complete discretion to decide whether
to award attorney's fees. Furthermore,
the trial court's decision on this issue
would not be overturned absent a manifest abuse of discretion.
Dissent Rejects Conflict of Interest
DisclosureRequirement
In his dissent, Justice Johnson maintained that the CPR encompassed situ60

I
ations where conflicts of interest were
likely, not merely possible. He reasoned that since there was a factual
issue concerning Denver's failure to
disclose a likely conflict of interest, the
conclusion that Denver violated the
CPR was unfounded. Furthermore,
Johnson argued that the majority's holding placed an unreasonable burden on
attorneys because there were potential
conflicts of interest in almost every
case of multiple representation, and an
attorney cannot foresee every conceivable situation.
DissentAdvocates MandatoryAward
of Attorney's Fees
Justice Johnson also dissented with
respect to the scope of the trial court's
discretion in awarding attorney's fees
under the CPA. He maintained that
since the statute mandates attorney's
fees, the trial court only had discretion
in the amount of the fees. oo
-

Jean Prendergast

Consumer Protection Act
Applies to Business

Purchase of a Sign
In Sign-O-Lite Signs, Inc. v.
DeLaurenti Florist, Inc., 825 P.2d
714 (Wash. 1992), the Washington
Court of Appeals held that the Consumer Protection Act ("CPA") applied
to the purchase of a sign. Additionally,
the court held that in the CPA violation, the lower court properly awarded
attorney's fees to the consumer.
Sign on the Dotted Line
Ann DeLaurenti ("DeLaurenti")
owned and operated DeLaurenti Florists, Inc., a floral shop located in a
shopping plaza. In April 1986,
DeLaurenti learned that the plaza had
adopted a policy that required all shops
in the plaza to advertise with

Channelume signs. Realizing that her
current wooden sign was unfit,
DeLaurenti sought bids and estimates
from various sign manufacturers for
the cost of a Channelume sign.
Chuck Kelly was a representative of
Sign-O-Lite Signs, Inc. ("Sign"), a
manufacturer of custom Channelume
signs. When Kelly learned of
DeLaurenti's interest in buying a sign,
he solicited DeLaurenti at her floral
shop and offered to submit a bid.
DeLaurenti agreed, and consequently
Kelly later called DeLaurenti and quoted
her a six year lease for a sign at $91.04
per month, or a purchase price for the
sign of $2,901.60. Sign's bid for the
sign was lower than any other company
that DeLaurenti contacted, and therefore, she accepted Sign's offer.
Subsequently, Kelly visited
DeLaurenti' s floral shop and presented
her with a document that he wanted her
to sign. Before signing the document,
DeLaurenti informed Kelly that she
did not have her reading glasses present.
However, Kelly assured her that the
document only authorized Sign to begin work; DeLaurenti signed the document. DeLaurenti did not see Kelly
write anything on the documents while
he was at the store.
Kelly failed to provide DeLaurenti
with a copy of the signed document or
any other description of the terms of
the purchase. Instead, DeLaurenti relied solely on the representations that
Kelly extended particularly to her, the
$91.04 per month lease charge and the
$2,901.60 total purchase price for the
sign.
Later, Sign sent DeLaurenti an invoice for $297.42 per month for the
lease of the sign. Since this price was
over three times the rate Kelly quoted
her, DeLaurenti refused to pay the
invoice. DeLaurenti later demanded
copies of the documents that she signed.
When she received the copies,
DeLaurenti noticed that the lease charge
of $297.42 per month was written on a
line in the document. Realizing that the
agreement was not anything that she
bargained for, DeLaurenti refused to
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pay the invoices that Sign subsequently
mailed to her.
Sign filed a collection suit against
DeLaurenti, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment on
DeLaurenti's part. DeLaurenti counterclaimed and alleged that Sign violated the CPA. The Washington trial
court held that Sign violated the CPA
and awarded DeLaurenti treble damages and attorney's fees. Sign appealed
the decision to the Washington Court
of Appeals.
Sign's Arguments Unplugged by
Appellate Court
The appellate court first addressed
Sign's argument that the trial court
erroneously submitted the CPA claim
to the jury because insufficient evidence existed to support it. The court
noted that a CPA violation occurs when
(1) the action complained of is a deceptive act or practice; (2) the action occurs in the conduct of trade or commerce; (3) sufficient evidence of public interest is presented; (4) injury to a
business transpires; and (5) a causal
link exists between the deceptive act
and the injury.
The court found that DeLaurenti
demonstrated all the elements of a CPA
violation and upheld her claim under
the CPA. First, the court stated that
Kelly's misleading DeLaurenti into
believing that she was signing a work
authorization form constituted an unfair act or practice in trade. Second,
the court found that Kelly's capacity as
Sign's agent presented sufficient evidence of an impact on the public interest. The court also found that
DeLaurenti suffered injury to her business, therefore meeting the fourth element of a CPA violation, because
Delaurenti had to spend time addressing the contract dispute rather that
attending the store. Lastly, the court
concluded that the deceptive act directly caused the injury to DeLaurenti's
business. Thus, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's finding that
Sign violated the CPA.
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Treble Damages Too Much
The court, however, agreed with
Sign's contention that treble damages
were improper since DeLaurenti could
not prove any actual damages. In its
determination, the court concluded that
attorney's fees were not actual damages as contemplated by the CPA.
Furthermore, the court concluded that
DeLaurenti's general and uncorroborated estimate of her lost profits
also failed to constitute actual damages. Therefore the court held that
since DeLaurenti could not prove any
actual damages, her claim for treble
damages was unsubstantiated.
Attorney' Fees were Reasonable
Awards
Although Sign did not dispute that
the CPA entitled DeLaurenti to
attorney's fees, it did argue that the
trial court improperly calculated the
award of attorney's fees. The court,
however, reasoned that the trial court
had discretion in awarding attorney's
fees, and thus, upheld the trial court's
determination. Furthermore, the appellate court noted that in its determination, the trial court segregated the
fees to the extent possible between the
CPA theories and other legal theories
presented by DeLaurenti. The appellate court deemed such action appropriate, and therefore concluded that the
lower court acted within its discretion.
Dissent Argued that Shop was Not
Significantly Injured
In his dissent, Judge Scholfield stated
that the evidence of injury to the floral
shop was insufficient to support the
award of attorney's fees. To support
this claim, Scholfield stated that neither attorney's fees in prosecuting a
CPA violation nor the time devoted to
the CPA litigation were sufficient proof
of injury. Thus, Scholfield concluded
that DeLaurenti failed to present sufficient evidence that she suffered a legally recognizable injury. *
- Ellen M. Sfikas

Toll-Free Phone Line Failed
to ProvideAdequate
Warning Under California
Statute
In Ingredient Communication
Council, Inc. v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr.
2d 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), the California Court of Appeals held that a tollfree phone line warning system failed
to clearly and reasonably warn consumers about dangerous chemicals contained in consumer products and therefore violated California's Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act
of 1986.
Failureto Warn
California's Safe Drinking Water
and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986
("Act") forbade any person or entity
from intentionally or knowingly exposing anyone to a chemical associated
with cancer or birth defects without
first giving "clear and reasonable" warning. The Act acknowledged that generalized warnings such as product labels, posted notices, and notices in
news media adequately warned consumers, assuming that they were "clear
and reasonable." The California State
Health and Welfare Agency ("Agency")
administered the Act and promulgated
regulations defining appropriate conduct under the Act.
The Ingredient Communication
Council, Inc. ("Council") is a nonprofit corporation consisting of thirtyseven manufacturers, retailers, and agricultural producers involved in marketing thousands of products in California stores. Founded in 1987, the
Council sought to help its members
comply with the Act. The Council
established a consumer warning system
based on a toll-free phone line in conjunction with newspaper advertising
and signs posted in stores. Although
the Council's advertisements and signs
failed to identify those products which
required warnings under the Act, they
invited consumers to call a toll-free
61

